By John Wyman, EAA 452533, Chapter 266, Montreal
Several years ago, a close friend of mine was kind enough to suggest my name to the producers of Mayday (or Air Disasters, as it is known in the United States) as a consultant on a couple of shows involving an Airbus 310-200 and an Airbus 300-600. It came out of the blue, but my phone subsequently rang, and indeed they were interested in my commentary as I had experience on the A310. I was familiar with its operation and moreover, more knowledgeable than their inventory of pilots on the show about this type. I admit that the invitation came as a real surprise, but little did I know what effect it’d have on me. I discovered, post interview, that it improved my ability to analyze accidents and get to the “source” of what many of them are about (in those episodes, situational awareness) and the uncanny ability of a small problem to become a big one. It also further spiked my interest in aviation accidents and how many viewers outside of the field “feel” they have a good grip on them without any “real” knowledge of two-crew operations and some of the particularities that come with it.
This isn’t to say that I have better knowledge than any of the real crash investigators out there. I am not one of them. They get to the source of the accidents and have the full gamut of materials to analyze every facet of the crash. I am on the outside looking in like everyone else. But I did get a glimpse into how the source of a crash can get buried in the technical jargon associated with flying a modern airliner, and how sometimes these accidents can purely be brought down to simpler things like misunderstandings between humans — that all humans have with one another. I also discovered in reading the reports, over and above “watching” their film re-creations — that the investigators themselves sometimes overlook the extent to which the human factors play a big part in what goes on in the flight deck.
One thing for sure is that a number of accidents are still happening. It may not be so much as a case of more of them, but there are more commentators out there offering up opinions. I find that disconcerting to some degree, and a lot of the info out there is outright false. People are coming up with conclusions about what happened well before the accident reports are released, and those same opinions are probably detrimental to the course of the investigation. I am sure investigators are just as human as the rest of us, and there must come a point when this flood of info that the social media platforms push can fundamentally change the course of an investigation’s focus without necessarily dictating that outright. Sensationalism can be subtle. Everyone nowadays has an opinion that they can get out there. A friend recently confided in me that our own government investigators were following a lead by the New York Times in an air accident. Since when does a researcher follow the claims of a newspaper? Isn’t that bias well before establishing any fact? Hopefully that’s a one-off and not the standard protocol.
The most recent disaster of Jeju Air Flight 2216 (December 29, 2024) has me scratching my head. It is probably the antithesis of what happened with the “Miracle on the Hudson” minus the miracle. Theories already abound on bird strikes, consecutive engine failures, and system problems that brought about the skidding crash. The crazy thing is Wikipedia already has a detailed summary of everything that happened that day with a total of nine subchapters underneath the main introductory body. The relatives of 179 deceased people are subjected to that landslide of information — be it true or false. They claim that everything is backed up unless a citation is needed, but that doesn’t prevent assumptions being made and claimed to be true. Until a real report is produced and the facts are double and triple cross-checked, there isn’t any true way of knowing what happened. The cockpit and flight data recorders should uncover some of the assumed facts. Witnesses should corroborate those — albeit there are only two survivors — and they were in the back of the airplane. There was a lot of video footage from the ground. In the meantime, we have the so-called experts claiming that the accident was, in large part, due to the wall built at the end of the runway without any proper over run — aside from the fact that the aircraft bellied in without any drag (gear or flaps), at high speed, touching down more than halfway down the runway! For now, the jury’s out on the real cause, but that doesn’t stop the pundits and wannabe investigators from coming up with something for the insatiable media and audience.
But…back to human factors.
After I had read the reports (for the shows), I came up with a clearer understanding of the events. My interpretation differed slightly to the final conclusion of one of the accidents, primarily because the investigators wanted to put a greater emphasis on Airbus not enforcing a service bulletin (without calling it an AD, airworthiness directive) instead of blaming it on miscommunication between the crew members. Airbus took it on the chin because their software update hadn’t been implemented to disconnect the autopilot at a lower counter-applied force from the crew. I thought that the human factors greatly outweighed these deficiencies in the autopilot, although previous incidents with the same software dictated otherwise. The fact that an autopilot was engaged without either crew member advising the other that it had been put on was the beginning of a chain of events that led to the ultimate destruction of the airplane. From then on, it was a downward spiral that neither crew member could get out of because the automation was difficult to track and their tasks were too focused in one area over another. The captain loaded up the F/O to the point that he was unable to process what was going on, and as a consequence, his (and the captain’s) overall situational awareness was distracted from the golden rule of flying the aircraft first, navigating second, and lastly, communicating with ATC. Since reading the reports and doing the shows I have either had or been witness to similar events in the flight deck. I can say with certainty that overconfidence or distraction can lead anyone to make the same mistakes as these crews did in a very short time span. It doesn’t take much to lose your overall command of events when the unexpected happens and you fall behind the airplane or you have a harder time coaching your colleague through a high and fast approach. It takes a lot of discipline to say, “enough is enough” and either assume control or call off a landing.
It came to light recently, during one of my flights, where I realized just how easy it is for two pilots to become overwhelmed with the basics of operating an aircraft without any major problem besetting them. Try to explain that to anyone sitting around the dinner table? They’ll instantly critique any of what you said based on their understanding of what they have heard about your profession with little to no knowledge of what it is to crew an airliner! The fact that you even suggest that something could go wrong without anything physically wrong with the aircraft would undoubtedly come as a huge surprise to them…but, the bottom line is, this sometimes does happen. Part of the problem is that pilots have to instruct pilots after they are released from training because the training can’t possibly cover all the unseen elements of flying the actual airliner, on the line. That is supposed to be covered during the line-indoctrination of the newbie pilot but even then not everything can be covered — so the balance gets put on the line pilot’s shoulders for them to highlight the finer points of flying the aircraft to the new pilot. This is particularly noticeable when the student comes out of training and is first tasked with performing a full descent from altitude using a combination of modes on the flight control unit. They seldom get the chance to do this in their initial training aside from simulating rapid depressurizations at altitude in the simulator, and even then, with that exercise, there is so much going on that it’s hard to focus on easily managing the airplane to a normal descent and landing. In a 16-session initial simulator schedule (4 hours per session), there isn’t a lot of room for refinement that you’d expect for a fully qualified pilot new to the aircraft type. It’s really on the line that they get to practice under the watchful eye of their colleagues.
I had a difficult time readjusting after I did the Mayday interviews. They were intense sessions. Once you’re into the material, it’s difficult to put it aside. For two weeks or more afterward, I had reoccurring thoughts (I suppose…nightmares?) on how I could have said this or that to properly convey what happened. I likely took it all a bit too seriously — but then again, I knew it was important to have a good grip on what happened versus just stumbling through the questioning. Ultimately, the interviews did more for my confidence than I did for them (the producers). They had no shortage of professionals weighing in on the reports. In fact, one interviewee was the author of the actual report, so they sourced the sources. Overall, the producers at Mayday do a great job of piecing together an accident and getting to their root cause(s). The Canadian-produced show has been on the airwaves for 25 seasons now. It is recognized all over the world and dubbed and translated into many languages. The day I wrote this it was the fourth most searched streaming documentary program (per Google). Countless hours are put into each production. They are accurate and succinct, even if there is that drama and sensationalism which keeps the viewer dialed in. I feel fortunate to have been invited to comment on two terrible accidents. It certainly gave me a greater awareness of the finer points of an accident report, and, more importantly, how to avoid being in them.
John Wyman, EAA 462533, Chapter 266 Montreal, is a passionate aviator. When he isn’t in the saddle at the airline, he can be found out at the airfield doing any number of things. He likes to fly gliders, practice aerobatics, write, work on airplanes, and fix stuff.